On balance I agree about MSHQ and burying Levene, but that's not a function of the SDR; "Defence Reform" has been going since last year and kicked in on 1 April (though some parts are provisional, such as appointing a National Armaments Director). Many of the weaknesses of the SDR are not the reviewers' fault, one of the most striking being its publication ahead of the National Security Strategy and without being informed by the China "audit" (whatever's happened to that). And the terms of reference issued last July were incredibly restrictive, so there were major issues like our fundamental strategic posture that were off limits. The government's comms management has also been woeful (and don't get me started on the almost compulsive leaking and early disclosure of most of the SDR's contents). There are good things in there, but it's not a "strategic" review (the Integrated Review began with a pretty clear vision of the UK's place in the world and national interests) and without an indication of available resources it's hard to know how much is achievable. The prose is also absolutely ghastly, which I suspect is not unrelated to the (supposed) fact that MoD has had the draft since February or March and has spent that time brutalising it.
Yes, but Defence Reform has been a quiet, behind-closed-doors process. The Review - with the Government promising to implement all its recommendations - puts it on much firmer footing.
No arguments from me on NSS and the China Audit. Nor on Government comms - although as I wrote it is unclear whether they were terrible by accident or design.
It couldn’t be a strategic review, for the reasons I argued in the paper, but also because:
1. It was, as you say, a Defence Review - it could not provide a long term vision, a description of what matters and how the world works, as the Integrated Review did (and nobody involved with the IR thinks it was a strategy, we all see its many and deep flaws). Still, making this a Defence only review was in my opinion a mistake.*
2. It was also therefore not able really to comment on things like supply chains and our dependencies and vulnerabilities, which are national security issues - leaving some of our biggest weaknesses unaddressed.
3. Most of the strategic trade-offs needed are inter-departmental, they could not be addressed here.
The prose is a weird mix of standard MOD impenetrable awfulness, and superbly clear, simply articulated argument. I share your view on why this.
*that said, I have some sympathy for something I saw ThinkDefence say that on X: that we should abolish reviews altogether. I am still trying to decide if on balance I agree.
Keith, Thank you. It is clearly your voice of reason and depth. I hope more people listen to the message you see in the Review and act, as best they can, but act they must.
As always, great forensic analysis Keith. Perhaps worth pausing on space (I would, of course) and reflecting that whilst I agree the specific section's recommendations are light, there are recommendations that have been pulled into other chapters including industry and innovation and allies/partners. Governance, whole of government, pace and embedding into all domains needs to be clarioned loudly. My worry is that the minds of those now making the hard decisions are embedded in current/old wisdom. Thinking about strategic threats in/from/through space does not yet have a loud voice (to your point about Space Command) so it risks becoming a discretionary activity. The hooks are there, they now need to be exploited.
On balance I agree about MSHQ and burying Levene, but that's not a function of the SDR; "Defence Reform" has been going since last year and kicked in on 1 April (though some parts are provisional, such as appointing a National Armaments Director). Many of the weaknesses of the SDR are not the reviewers' fault, one of the most striking being its publication ahead of the National Security Strategy and without being informed by the China "audit" (whatever's happened to that). And the terms of reference issued last July were incredibly restrictive, so there were major issues like our fundamental strategic posture that were off limits. The government's comms management has also been woeful (and don't get me started on the almost compulsive leaking and early disclosure of most of the SDR's contents). There are good things in there, but it's not a "strategic" review (the Integrated Review began with a pretty clear vision of the UK's place in the world and national interests) and without an indication of available resources it's hard to know how much is achievable. The prose is also absolutely ghastly, which I suspect is not unrelated to the (supposed) fact that MoD has had the draft since February or March and has spent that time brutalising it.
Yes, but Defence Reform has been a quiet, behind-closed-doors process. The Review - with the Government promising to implement all its recommendations - puts it on much firmer footing.
No arguments from me on NSS and the China Audit. Nor on Government comms - although as I wrote it is unclear whether they were terrible by accident or design.
It couldn’t be a strategic review, for the reasons I argued in the paper, but also because:
1. It was, as you say, a Defence Review - it could not provide a long term vision, a description of what matters and how the world works, as the Integrated Review did (and nobody involved with the IR thinks it was a strategy, we all see its many and deep flaws). Still, making this a Defence only review was in my opinion a mistake.*
2. It was also therefore not able really to comment on things like supply chains and our dependencies and vulnerabilities, which are national security issues - leaving some of our biggest weaknesses unaddressed.
3. Most of the strategic trade-offs needed are inter-departmental, they could not be addressed here.
The prose is a weird mix of standard MOD impenetrable awfulness, and superbly clear, simply articulated argument. I share your view on why this.
*that said, I have some sympathy for something I saw ThinkDefence say that on X: that we should abolish reviews altogether. I am still trying to decide if on balance I agree.
Keith, Thank you. It is clearly your voice of reason and depth. I hope more people listen to the message you see in the Review and act, as best they can, but act they must.
As always, great forensic analysis Keith. Perhaps worth pausing on space (I would, of course) and reflecting that whilst I agree the specific section's recommendations are light, there are recommendations that have been pulled into other chapters including industry and innovation and allies/partners. Governance, whole of government, pace and embedding into all domains needs to be clarioned loudly. My worry is that the minds of those now making the hard decisions are embedded in current/old wisdom. Thinking about strategic threats in/from/through space does not yet have a loud voice (to your point about Space Command) so it risks becoming a discretionary activity. The hooks are there, they now need to be exploited.
Excellent Keith. I suggest more formal publishing.